RugbyRebels

Sandydragon wrote: ↑Fri Nov 11, 2022 11:17 am

Puja wrote: ↑Fri Nov 11, 2022 10:55 am Okay, I was clearly wrong. Russia aren't attempting to cover their retreat with PR - they've just announced that it's been fully completed and it's a complete success with no casualties, no equipment loss, no panic, no confusion, no forces still left on the wrong side...

No attempts to change any kind of PR tack at all, just continual ThisIsFine.gif. Wild!

Puja

Me too as I thought it was a very unsubtle trap. Could still be but I assume that they are trying to make it look orderly to the home audience. Its no small thing to withdraw 40K troops and others from an area thats seeing active military activity across limited bridges. I'm reading the Prevail partners update which is highlighting that if any of the conscripts panic (which must have been a high risk) then the whole thing could have fallen apart.

Maybe making the withdrawal so public made the Ukrainians more cautious and gave the Russians breathing space? The big question, assuming nothing unexpected happens as UKR troops close in and secure the west bank, is whether they try to force a river crossing whilst Russian troops are tired and demoralised and before they can complete whatever defensive fortifications they have in mind.

Alternatively the Ukrainians might decide to shift focus, or just wait for the ground to harden.

EDIT. Just had a thought. Putin is no where to be seen. Assuming that he hasn't had an 'accident', its quite possible that by putting his defence minister (who allegedly is on borrowed time) and a front line commander on the screen to be making the decision, Putin can shield himself from any blowback. Not sure how likely that is but Russian politics is far from clear.

Puja wrote: ↑Fri Nov 11, 2022 11:46 amI can't see Ukraine forcing a crossing. It's asking for trouble in this weather and they cannot afford to be pinned against the river's edge and annihilated. Much more likely to step up the attacks in Zaporizhzhia in the spring and look to hook round behind them.

Puja wrote: ↑Fri Nov 11, 2022 11:46 am

Sandydragon wrote: ↑Fri Nov 11, 2022 11:17 am

Puja wrote: ↑Fri Nov 11, 2022 10:55 am Okay, I was clearly wrong. Russia aren't attempting to cover their retreat with PR - they've just announced that it's been fully completed and it's a complete success with no casualties, no equipment loss, no panic, no confusion, no forces still left on the wrong side...

No attempts to change any kind of PR tack at all, just continual ThisIsFine.gif. Wild!

Puja

Me too as I thought it was a very unsubtle trap. Could still be but I assume that they are trying to make it look orderly to the home audience. Its no small thing to withdraw 40K troops and others from an area thats seeing active military activity across limited bridges. I'm reading the Prevail partners update which is highlighting that if any of the conscripts panic (which must have been a high risk) then the whole thing could have fallen apart.

Maybe making the withdrawal so public made the Ukrainians more cautious and gave the Russians breathing space? The big question, assuming nothing unexpected happens as UKR troops close in and secure the west bank, is whether they try to force a river crossing whilst Russian troops are tired and demoralised and before they can complete whatever defensive fortifications they have in mind.

Alternatively the Ukrainians might decide to shift focus, or just wait for the ground to harden.

EDIT. Just had a thought. Putin is no where to be seen. Assuming that he hasn't had an 'accident', its quite possible that by putting his defence minister (who allegedly is on borrowed time) and a front line commander on the screen to be making the decision, Putin can shield himself from any blowback. Not sure how likely that is but Russian politics is far from clear.

I think you're right and Putin is definitely insulating himself from this decision. Whether he'll use it later, I don't know, but he's certainly giving himself manouevring room.

I can't see Ukraine forcing a crossing. It's asking for trouble in this weather and they cannot afford to be pinned against the river's edge and annihilated. Much more likely to step up the attacks in Zaporizhzhia in the spring and look to hook round behind them.

Puja

Which Tyler wrote: ↑Fri Nov 11, 2022 12:43 pm I think it's anyone's guess where Ukraine's next move will come, but I don't think we'll see it before Spring (or not across open ground, at any rate).
Weather is getting worse, they've an ongoing offensive around Kreminina and Svatove (which I think they were overly optimistic about after rapidly reaching the Zherebets River) and an ongoing (heavy) defence around Bakhmut; and losing some really key ground to the East of Siverk. Those soldiers now freed up around Kherson will still have to double check the area they've liberated, and de-mine the area; and they'll be pretty knackered and shell-shocked as well.

Those troops should be looking for some R&R, whilst newer troops secure the newly liberated area and moving the artillery up towards the right bank, to spend the winter bombarding the Russian troops on the left.
Then they'll look to redeploy elsewhere, and they've got plenty of time to get there (unless Bakhmut is worse than it's looking so far).

Of course, Russia will be looking to do the same with their troops (Assuming basic competence, which is quite a generous assumption).

Everyone expects the next Ukrainian offensive to head South from Kamyanske, Orikhiv and Hulyaipole towards Melitopol; and Russia seems to be prepared for that (unless those troop movements were feints, of course). I'm not convinced that doing what your enemy expects you to do is the best tactic in war.

Spring offensive in the Kreminina / Svatove region is to be expected, and IMO inevitable.
I think the second offensive may just be where Russia is strong, but set-up to attack, rather than defend. Maybe a push E & SE from Bakhmut &/ SE from Siversk. If you could bust through there, I think the next Russian defensive line is 20+km back, near enough at the 2020 border; which would also then leave Lyschansk cut off from supply South of the S-D river.

cashead wrote: ↑Sat Nov 12, 2022 10:36 pm A couple of Ukrainian soldiers showing the shit (emphasis on shit) that the Russians have left behind.

I, for one, can not fathom why Russia is losing this war. Will wonders never cease?

Which Tyler wrote: ↑Sun Nov 13, 2022 10:51 am

cashead wrote: ↑Sat Nov 12, 2022 10:36 pm A couple of Ukrainian soldiers showing the shit (emphasis on shit) that the Russians have left behind.

I, for one, can not fathom why Russia is losing this war. Will wonders never cease?

That's what? pre WWI?

Sandydragon wrote: ↑Sun Nov 13, 2022 2:49 pm Looks more like an improvised firearm using a number of components.I've done familiarisation courses on Russian weaponry but never seen anything like that. If regular Russian troops have been carrying that then heaven help them. I have to say that its more likely that irregulars supporting the Russians have made that themselves.

Sandydragon wrote: ↑Mon Nov 14, 2022 8:22 pm I agree with you, until Ukraine confirms a town or city liberated, I treat it all as speculation. It could also be Ukraine sponsored bullshit designed to scare Russians and think they are being cut off.

cashead wrote: ↑Wed Nov 16, 2022 12:01 am Yes, but have you considered "nah, fuck Russia. Fuck around and find out, you fashy horse-cum guzzling clownshow" at any point?

Sandydragon wrote: ↑Tue Nov 15, 2022 9:25 pm BBC reporting that Russian missiles have hit Poland killing 2 people. Russian state media is of course blaming Ukraine. Poland’s national security council is meeting to consider its response.

This was sadly highly likely to happen given the amount of ordnance that Russia is throwing about. Technically this is a direct attack on a Nato country and Poland could trigger Article 5 and a collective military response. But I hope sound minds prevail and this doesn’t escalate.

Poland missile ‘unlikely’ to have been fired from Russia, Biden says

US president says trajectory of missile suggests it was not launched by Russian forces waging war in Ukraine but will await results of investigation

Joe Biden has said the missile that landed in Poland, killing two people, was unlikely to have been fired from Russia due to its trajectory.

The US president was speaking at the G20 meeting in Bali, Indonesia, after convening an emergency meeting of western leaders to discuss the explosion on Nato territory that has the potential to take the war in Ukraine into a new even more dangerous dimension.

Asked if the missile was fired from Russia, Biden said: “There is preliminary information that contests that. I don’t want to say that until we completely investigate. But it is unlikely in the minds [sic] of its trajectory that it was fired from Russia.” He added: “But we will see, we will see.”

...

ARTICLE CONTINUES

Which Tyler wrote: ↑Wed Nov 16, 2022 7:38 am

Sandydragon wrote: ↑Tue Nov 15, 2022 9:25 pm BBC reporting that Russian missiles have hit Poland killing 2 people. Russian state media is of course blaming Ukraine. Poland’s national security council is meeting to consider its response.

This was sadly highly likely to happen given the amount of ordnance that Russia is throwing about. Technically this is a direct attack on a Nato country and Poland could trigger Article 5 and a collective military response. But I hope sound minds prevail and this doesn’t escalate.

First it needs to be clarified whether these were Russian missiles or Ukrainian - from what I can tell it's still in doubt (as in, I'm seeing people and analysts I trust in stringent disagreement with each other).
If Russian, it needs to be clarified if it was accidental, "accidental" or deliberate.

If Russian then there's a good chance that article 4 will be triggered; but highly unlikely article 5 (that would, presumably, require deliberate and rather blatant targetting of Poland by Russia - even then, I'm not convinced A5 would be triggered over 2 dead people).

The most likely responses (if Russian) seem to me, that NATO send a couple of cruise missiles at Russian targets deep in occupied Ukraine (maybe even hitting the Kerch bridge or Sevastopol) &/ a marked increase in the number and type of weapons sent to Ukraine, certainly including anti-aircraft or anti-missile systems, and possibly even the ATACMS Ukraine have been asking for recently.
Oh, and I would expect air defence to be beefed up in Poland, Romania, Lithuania etc

J Dory wrote: ↑Sat Nov 19, 2022 10:44 pm Big explosion near St Petersburgh according to some sites, gas pipeline possibly.

Northeast – Kharkiv and Western Luhansk Area of Operations

The Russian Federation Armed Forces (RFAF) operating in Luhansk Oblast remain focused on preventing the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) from making significant ground towards Troitske, Svatove, and the P-66 Main Supply Route (MSR). The RFAF have constructed defensive lines which have transitioned from ‘hasty’ to ‘deliberate and planned’ since the rapid capitulation in Kharkiv Oblast.
The weather over the reporting period has been poor, with heavy rain causing issues with mud which have significantly slowed both UAF and RFAF offensive operations. The reduced pace of manoeuvre explains the reporting of increased artillery use, aiming to destroy normally mobile units. ​
The RFAF conducted assaults near Lyman and Kreminna, but this did not result in a change in territorial control.
Russia continues to hold the defensive line along the P-66/Aidar River and has reinforced defensive positions with mobilised soldiers (‘mobiks’). Some reporting indicates that the UAF have advanced to within direct fire range of a stretch of the P-66 south of Svatove towards Novovodyane. If true, this will force RFAF resupply to take a lengthy detour towards Starobilsk to resupply Svatove from Sievierodonetsk. ​

East – Donbas Area of Operations (assessed RFAF Operational Main Effort)

The assessed RFAF main effort to clear Donetsk Oblast of Ukrainian forces is ongoing. Russia continues offensive operations near Bakhmut along a line 14km southwest near Klischivka, stretching to 30km northeast near Yakovlivka. Some Russian mil-bloggers report fighting 3km southwest of Bakhmut as RFAF slowly advance; however, this is yet to be confirmed. Russia has reportedly attacked Bakhmut with incendiary munitions – an act banned in areas with a civilian presence, according to the Geneva Conventions.
The possible break-in of the RFAF to Opytne reported last week was either false or the RFAF were subsequently forced to withdraw, as at this time the town reportedly remains in Ukrainian hands. Ivanhrad, less than a kilometre northeast of Opytne is contested.
Northwest of Donetsk City near Pisky, the RFAF continue to launch ineffective assaults against the UAF defenders at Vodyane and Pervomaiske; fighting is reportedly ongoing.
The Russian military has threatened mobilised soldiers (and prisoner ‘volunteers’) with execution or imprisonment if they retreat, it is reported. Both professional RFAF and Wagner Private Military Company (PMC) soldiers are reported to have threatened demoralised troops to prevent retreat.

South – Kherson, Zaporizhia and Black Sea Coast Area of Operations

There have been no reported territorial changes along the Forward Line of Enemy Troops (FLET) in Zaporizhia Oblast. The RFAF continues to degrade UAF defences around Pavlivka and Vulhedar with artillery but has not renewed any major ground offensive since failing to advance last week.
On the morning of 22 November, a Ukrainian spokesperson from the Southern Operational Command stated that UAF elements were operating on the Kinburn Spit, which is located at the westernmost tip of the Kinburn Peninsula to the west-southwest of Kherson city. There have previously been unconfirmed reports of Ukrainian Special Operations Forces crossing the river from Okachiv only 4 km away on the right bank as the Russians withdrew from Kharkiv on 13/14 November. Control of the Kinburn Spit provides control over the narrow shipping lane that connects the Dnipro and Southern Bug Rivers with the Black Sea. It is also claimed on social media that the RFAF do not have artillery on the peninsula within range of the Kinburn Spit, with it instead located further northeast to shell the right bank where the river is narrower.
There is limited reporting to indicate that small pockets of RFAF remain present and active on the right bank of the Dnipro in Kherson. These groups are likely to slow and hinder UAF operations to clear the recaptured territory and return civilians to their homes.

Russia continues to shell settlements on the right bank of the Dnipro in Kherson Oblast from across the river using rocket and tube artillery.
On the left bank of the Dnipro, along the new Russian defensive line, mobilised troops are pushed forward to the first line whilst professional soldiers man the second and third lines of defence – further lowering both the morale and effectiveness of the poorly-trained and led mobiks.

Strategic/Political

On 20 and 21 November 2022, Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) was heavily shelled. Both sides have accused the other of the shelling; however, even some pro-Russian bloggers and telegram channels have stated the point of origin for the artillery fire was from the south of the ZNPP in Russian-controlled territory.
The head of Rosatom, the Russian Nuclear Power company, has stated that the activity could cause a ‘nuclear disaster’. Regular artillery shells are unlikely to penetrate the hardened structures of the nuclear power plant but are capable of significantly damaging fuel storage facilities – which could cause a more limited radiological incident.
There are unverified rumours on Russian mil-blogger channels that the RFAF is preparing to withdraw from ZNPP and the associated town of Enerhodar, and hand control of the plant to the International Atomic Energy Agency and from there to Kyiv’s control.


The Ukrainian Security Services (SBU) reportedly raided the Orthodox Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra Monastery on the morning of 22 November. The raid was reportedly conducted to counter suspected “subversive activities by Russian special services”. The SBU and national police also reportedly raided the Koretsky Holy Trinity Monastery and the premises of the Sarnensko-Polyska eparchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchy in the Rivne region.


So What?

It is likely that the lack of reporting over the last 96hrs regarding a Russian withdrawal in northern Kharkiv Oblast is indicative of a Russian intent to continue to hold the defensive line along the P-66 for as long as it is tenable, assisted by the wet weather causing reduced mobility.
The mobiks deployed to this front are almost certain to have very low morale, which in turn will reduce their combat effectiveness in the face of determined UAF assaults which are likely to renew once the ground starts to freeze and mud becomes less of an issue. The mobiks are poorly trained and equipped; they are effectively forced to remain at the front out of fear of imprisonment or execution by their own countrymen.
The increased use of artillery caused by the deteriorating weather is likely to be difficult for both supply chains to maintain. This is likely due to the propensity to move artillery ammunition to forward distribution points using trucks, which are liable to get bogged down. Artillery ammunition resupply is one of the most difficult logistical challenges due to the vast volume and mass of the shells and rockets.
Russian attacks against Bakhmut are likely to continue as additional mobilised RFAF personnel are deployed to western Donetsk Oblast. Experienced troops who evacuated from the Kherson front are likely to continue to deploy to the area, and it is a realistic possibility that artillery and combat support functions will become more efficient in the second echelon as these troops arrive. The use of incendiary munitions by the RFAF is likely to continue in order to force UAF troops into hard cover, disrupt reinforcement and UAF troop movement, and burn fortifications/strongholds. It is highly likely that the contest for Bakhmut will continue to be attritional in nature and will depend on which side can reinforce at the highest rate.
As occurred with Opytne (and multiple other locations throughout the conflict), Russian mil-bloggers are likely to pre-emptively declare control of Ukrainian towns to improve morale among their own forces (who have reduced access and significantly reduced trust in western media outlets) and to confuse the information space.
It is unlikely that the UAF have landed any significant bodies of force across the Dnipro to the Kinburn Peninsula. As previously assessed, the ground there is not suitable for mechanised or armoured formations. It is likely the UAF intend to deny the use of the Peninsula and Spit to Russian forces, particularly from indirect fire assets which have previously been used to shell Okachiv and other Ukrainian settlements on the right bank.
Russian shelling and disruption caused by stay-behind units on the right bank in Kherson are highly likely intend to slow Ukrainian clearance operations and delay any attempt to conduct a river crossing in Kherson and maintain offensive momentum. The Ukrainians are unlikely to rush into an ill-fated crossing under fire and are likely to continue to use precision fires to target RFAF reinforcements, logistics nodes, and high-value targets such as engineering vehicles. These UAF attacks are likely shaping activity as preparation for future offensives once the Russians are sufficiently degraded or are pulled away to another threat axis.
It is highly likely that there is no military reason for Russia to shell the Russian-controlled ZNPP. However, it is a realistic possibility that for political or deceptive reasons, Russia is shelling the plant as a false-flag attack and to raise international concerns that there will be a nuclear disaster – which can only be averted by the IAEA/West putting pressure on the Ukrainian government to declare the plant a demilitarised or ‘safe’ area. The risk of a nuclear disaster is very low whilst the reactors are cold and have been ‘scrammed’; however, a more limited radiological incident caused by damage to nuclear fuel storage is unlikely but possible.
SBU and National Police raids on Orthodox churches are likely to be met with significant vitriol on social media and among Russophone Ukrainian nationals. Raiding sites of religious significance is always challenging, and in this instance, it is almost certain that the raids will be amplified among Russian media in order to gain more public support for the ongoing ‘Special Military Operation’. It is likely that the Russian state security services (SVR and FSB) and military intelligence (GRU) have agents operating among the clergy and congregation of Russian Orthodox churches overseas, particularly in Ukraine.
The recently published graphics (see above tweet) showing remaining Russian PGM stocks are likely to be relatively accurate. The UAF are likely showing their understanding to garner greater Western military support – and add emphasis to requests for additional air defence equipment. It is worth noting that the individual missile type in the largest supply is the S-300. The S-300 is designed as a surface-to-air missile system and is not accurate enough when used in land-attack mode to be considered a ‘precision’ munition. S-300 missiles have also been in production for a long time (originally being a Soviet-era system), hence the large number available at the outset of the invasion. The reportedly very low stocks of Iskander missiles are likely to explain the high interest of Russia in purchasing Iranian ballistic missiles, which could likely fill the same role.
What Next?

It is a realistic possibility that the UAF will continue to conduct offensive operations in the east of Kharkiv Oblast to make the situation untenable and force a Russian withdrawal to a shorter more defensible line along the Siverskyi Donets river north of Luhansk. It is unlikely that the UAF will be able to cut the P-66 north of Svatove within the next week, and unlikely that Russia will be compelled to withdraw forces before mid-December 2022. It is likely that the seasonal rains will continue to create conditions in which it is difficult for offensive forces to gain momentum or rapidly exploit any localised victories or penetration of RFAF defensive lines.

It is highly likely that morale among mobiks will remain low, or decrease further as they are forced to remain at the front in poor conditions and with little training. It is unlikely that this will cause an increase in surrenders to the UAF as the mobiks likely fear being used for a prisoner exchange and subsequently punished by the RFAF. It is likely that the fear of punishment for soldiers that retreat or surrender is of a greater immediate concern than the chance of being killed by the UAF; therefore, the troops are likely to attempt to fight to hold the line irrespective of the chances of success.

The landing of small UAF units on the Kinburn Spit/Peninsula is unlikely to precede a larger landing in the short term. It is likely that the UAF will use their presence there to prevent re-occupation by the RFAF and to force the Russians to redeploy forces to block the threat – which may create opportunities elsewhere in the battlespace. It is likely that Russian stay-behind forces on the right bank in Kherson will continue to conduct delaying and disruptive activities in the short term until killed or captured.

If the SBU can find credible evidence of SVR/GRU activity linked to the Russian Orthodox church, it is highly likely that more raids on religious buildings will occur. This is likely to further spur Russian amplification of the narrative that this activity is Russophobic repression of a religious institution and further justifies their invasion of Ukraine. The Government of Ukraine will need to be seen to be very transparent and considerate during the investigation in order not to alienate both Orthodox Ukrainian nationals and Western supporters. United States/Western experiences of Mosques being used for military purposes in Iraq and Afghanistan are likely to provide the SBU with some leeway in their actions without undermining military aid provision.

Attacks on Ukrainian electrical infrastructure are likely to continue to occur frequently. It remains a real possibility that the next concentrated strike will occur using a proportion of Iranian-made weaponry. The number of Russian missiles remaining stated in the UAF graphic is indicative that, in spite of extensive use (and oft-reported limited remaining supplies), Russia is unlikely to stop strikes against infrastructure. Russia will almost certainly continue to seek both external suppliers of munitions, and mechanisms to circumvent sanctions to increase domestic PGM production and sustain their long-range strike campaign.

cashead wrote: ↑Tue Nov 29, 2022 5:56 am Russia were allegedly contemplating attacking Japan during the summer of 2021. I guess Vlad's still butthurt over the Russo-Japanese War.

Can't imagine that going too well.