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Someone raised the very valid point that, it doesn't actually matter how hypersonic and difficult to lead a missile is if you're aiming everything directly for the enemy's anti-missile systems. You're basically providing a straight shot back down the barrel.Son of Mathonwy wrote: ↑Tue May 16, 2023 6:47 pmNice to see Putin depleting his arsenal. Imagine the scenes in Putin's war room.
And radar is a hell of a lot faster than sound.Puja wrote: ↑Wed May 17, 2023 12:45 amSomeone raised the very valid point that, it doesn't actually matter how hypersonic and difficult to lead a missile is if you're aiming everything directly for the enemy's anti-missile systems. You're basically providing a straight shot back down the barrel.Son of Mathonwy wrote: ↑Tue May 16, 2023 6:47 pmNice to see Putin depleting his arsenal. Imagine the scenes in Putin's war room.
Puja
300,000km/s vs 0.3km/sSon of Mathonwy wrote: ↑Wed May 17, 2023 3:18 pmAnd radar is a hell of a lot faster than sound.Puja wrote: ↑Wed May 17, 2023 12:45 amSomeone raised the very valid point that, it doesn't actually matter how hypersonic and difficult to lead a missile is if you're aiming everything directly for the enemy's anti-missile systems. You're basically providing a straight shot back down the barrel.Son of Mathonwy wrote: ↑Tue May 16, 2023 6:47 pm
Nice to see Putin depleting his arsenal. Imagine the scenes in Putin's war room.
Puja
And the speed of the intercept missile. The requirement for some networked sensors would also be key, but maybe the Ukrainians have been gifted some of those.Zhivago wrote: ↑Wed May 17, 2023 9:52 pm300,000km/s vs 0.3km/sSon of Mathonwy wrote: ↑Wed May 17, 2023 3:18 pmAnd radar is a hell of a lot faster than sound.Puja wrote: ↑Wed May 17, 2023 12:45 am
Someone raised the very valid point that, it doesn't actually matter how hypersonic and difficult to lead a missile is if you're aiming everything directly for the enemy's anti-missile systems. You're basically providing a straight shot back down the barrel.
Puja
I guess the computer processing is the main limitation.
The intelligence leak concerning Wagner is interesting. Clearly Prigoshin is no fan of operational security, but would he really agree to disclose Russian army formations in response for allow him to be seen to take ground? He has staked a lot on being able to deliver Bakhmut, but thats a huge step to take. Its been clear for a while that the Russian chain of command is not entirely united and there's a lot of factions playing against each other. When Wagner was fairly small and confined to Syria and Africa, the risk of blowback to Putin was small. Now, however, there is a potential that the Russian Army and Wagner could cease to cooperate (more so than they are now), or even to openly come into conflict, and is Prigoshin now too powerful to sack? In his haste to whip up some replacements for his initial casualties, has Putin created himself a giant headache?Ukraine – Military and Political Situation and Outlook – as at 0900A 18 May 2023
19 May
Tactical Military
Within Bakhmut City, Donetsk Oblast, Wagner Forces have made marginal gains in the urban centre, however Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) have continued to make territorial gains on the flanks of the town. Geo-located footage being circulated by mil-bloggers has shown yet more evidence of Russian Federation Armed Forces (RFAF) troops withdrawing and/or surrendering as UAF gradually advance and clear trenches demonstrating combined arms warfare. Similarly, the UAF have taken RFAF positions in vicinity of Serebrianka Forest area, Bilohorivka, Luhansk Oblast.
So What?
The UAF ability to keep RFAF assets away from Ivanivske (5km south-west of Bakhmut), will highly likely serve to prolong the Russian offensive in Bakhmut. The Main Supply Routes (MSRs) from the west are vital to ensure that UAF are not cut off from supplies which are critical in maintaining the attrition of (for the most part) Wagner forces. Yet more widely, it is highly likely that the initiative has now been taken by the UAF who are applying the training and equipment provided by its allies to conduct localised counter offensives. As previously assessed, it is highly likely that the UAF counter offensive will be a series of localised counter attacks using the panacea of personnel and equipment available when environmental and tactical conditions allow. The UAF are evidently able to seize the initiative under these conditions and exploit RFAF defensive weakness, lack of RFAF preparedness and experience. As in the last reporting period, the UAF have continued to apply pressure to the flanks of Bakhmut, causing inexperienced RFAF troops to withdraw or surrender, creating further pressure on Wagner forces within the city, highly likely contributing to the frustration seen by Wagner-owner Yevgeniy Prigozhin. The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) had attempted to counter the UAF successes with disinformation purporting RFAF success however, Prigozhin was quick to dispel these claims. Once again, these public disputes amid tactical failures for the RFAF allude to the highly likely lack of communication on the battlefield as well as the command and control required to co-ordinate different elements with different abilities and capabilities across a large area. Whilst currently the Russian inability to co-ordinate is most obvious in the ongoing battle within Bakhmut and the surrounding areas (as it remains highly likely the main effort for Russia); this situation is highly likely to be emulated across the frontline as UAF counter attacks gain more traction elsewhere. Russian resistance and defences are likely to be more robust in areas which are under the sole control of Regular Russian Army formations, despite the increasing use of poorly trained ‘mobiks’ to make up for losses to professional soldiers early in the war.
Operational / Strategic Military
RFAF strike activity continues to be observed across Ukraine, with several strikes reported overnight on the 15 & 16 May 2023. Post-strike reflections indicated that the RFAF utilised a combination of air-launched, sea-launched, and UAS systems to engage its targets. However, according to local officials its air defence systems successfully intercepted all missiles over Kyiv city, including six Kinzhal-47M2 missile systems.
Leaked US intelligence accessed by The Washington Post has revealed an alleged offer made by Yevgeniy Prigozhin, the financier of the Wagner Group, to disclose Russian troop positions to Ukrainian intelligence in exchange for the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from Bakhmut. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reportedly rejected Prigozhin's offer due to a lack of trust. Prigozhin downplayed his reported cooperation, stating that exchanging information is common in warfare and that troop positions are not secretive in modern warfare due to satellite imagery. He also denied the validity of the leaked US intelligence documents.
So What?
Recent RFAF strike activity is demonstrative of its intent to employ a multi-vector attack strategy designed to overwhelm UAF air defence systems, or at least understand them. However, the reported interception of six Kinzhal-47M2 missiles has generated notable online discussion. There are two competing narratives in-play: one, Russia overstated its capabilities; or two, the UAF did not intercept these missiles and are amplifying this narrative to bolster support from Western partners and undermine the Russian defence and technology industries. If the former argument is correct, this is a significant blow to Russia. Throughout the conflict Russian messaging on the Kinzhal-47M2 has centred on the system’s ability to avoid interception and was a fundamental part of its ‘next generation’ weapons capability – which forms an integral part of their current and future nuclear deterrent. These are concerns which were also echoed by US officials in the early stages of the conflict. Therefore, any successful interception will be considered to be a huge boost for the UAF and wider western users of the PATRIOT system. Some experts have commented that the hypersonic moniker was misleading, and pressure will now be on Russia’s nuclear scientists and tacticians to allay fears within the Kremlin. This event, if independently verified, is also an endorsement of the PATRIOT system. Ukrainian officials will likely continue to amplify this reported success to encourage the US to increase its support of this capability. However, this angle will likely not be without some pushback, domestically, within Congress. The PATRIOT system is expensive – reportedly in excess of $1 billion USD – and comes with a significant training burden. The US also considers the PATRIOT system a high-demand asset, with most of its existing batteries deployed in support of US force protection, or to enable its own modernisation cycles. This is a long-term consideration for Zelenskyy. For the latter argument, questions remain within some areas of the media whether the UAF could achieve what it claims to have achieved. The RFAF have also been amplifying its own narrative, claiming that it has successfully destroyed one PATRIOT battery – including meme coverage through its own diplomatic social channels. Consequently, the information landscape remains opaque as both sides seek to influence both domestic and international audiences. In the immediate term, RFAF commanders will now be considering whether to continue to employ a multi-vector attack strategy, at risk of depleting munition stocks with limited operational success. Or the RFAF revises its approach to using more loitering munitions (at a lower cost to the Russian MoD) to potentially defeat UAF radar systems.
The probability of immediate changes resulting from the allegations of Prigozhin collaborating with the GUR is low. The Kremlin is unlikely to remove Prigozhin in the near term, as his removal would disrupt the Wagner forces in Donbas and jeopardise Russian lines in Bakhmut. Moreover, the unique operational autonomy of the Wagner Group, which exists as a separate entity detached from the established trappings of the Russian government and MoD, introduces a complex web of circumstances. Removing Prigozhin from his leadership role would likely necessitate the direct imposition of Kremlin control over Wagner – something that the Kremlin demonstrably has no appetite for.
While the Kremlin has overtly dismissed the allegations as nothing more than a fabrication, it remains a realistic possibility that this revelation could be exploited as an opportune moment to undermine Prigozhin's credibility (possibly by Shoigu and the Russian MoD), branding him as a turncoat and traitor. Such a strategy would likely progressively erode his power and influence over time. This strategy would align with the recent warning voiced by State Duma Parliamentarian Viktor Sobolev, cautioning that individuals who choose to join the ranks of the Wagner private military company (PMC) could face a severe sentence of 10 to 15 years imprisonment, as Wagner is deemed an unlawful armed formation within the boundaries of Russia. Nevertheless, the intricate interplay of multifaceted dynamics and the imperative for the Russian government to uphold a formal distance from the Wagner Group create an air of uncertainty surrounding the ultimate outcome.
Political
On 17 May 2023, Russian and Iranian Transport Ministers signed a bilateral agreement on the joint construction of the Rasht-Astara Railway. Forming a section of the ship, rail, road transport corridor from India, Iran, Azerbaijan, and to Russia, known as the International North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC); its construction has been purported to rival the Suez Canal. Rasht, Iran, and Astara, on the border of Iran and Azerbaijan will be a 170km section of rail which will handrail the western side of the Caspian Sea. Its construction is reported to take four years at a cost of 1.6 billion USD.
So What?
Given the time required for construction, it is highly unlikely that this will have an immediate economic effect for countries which rely on the INSTC. What is notable about the agreement however is its timing. Russia and Iran have been fostering a deepened relationship since the start of the Ukrainian conflict, with Russia seeking to maintain allies and establish economic channels amid western sanctions. Also, there has been a continued narrative amongst Russia and its allies on the shifting of power away from the West. This narrative is highly likely being made manifest on a joint construction project which purports to rival existing transport corridors. Domestically for Russia, this narrative and agreement is likely intended to place it in a position of strength, being able to tangibly demonstrate its independence from the West. There is a likely element of futureproofing for Russia in this project, regardless of the outcome in Ukraine, Russia will likely be suffering the consequences of Western sanctions for years to come. Therefore, joint construction will highly likely mean joint ownership for Russia, likely taking influence from China and the Belt and Road Initiative which has seen China retain ownership of its own construction projects abroad, knowing that host nations are unlikely to repay loan agreements. It should be considered that given China has courted both Russia and Iran separately and has not publicly been involved in the Russia/Iran relationship of late. It remains a possibility that China has had some involvement in the project, this would possibly be in the form of discreetly funding the Russian financial contribution, given its considerable constraints of the conflict in Ukraine.
What Next?
The Russian airstrikes seen in Kyiv this reporting period, public disputes between the Kremlin and Prigozhin, and the UAFs territorial gains around Bakhmut highly likely indicate ongoing infighting, disunity and frustration that is highly unlikely to be resolved soon. Be it tactical or strategic, the Russian MoD’s inability to communicate constructively and cohere a plan continues to have catastrophic consequences for the Special Military Operation (SMO). These frustrations continue to be seen in the renewed intensity of long-range strikes conducted against Ukraine, likely aimed at Destruction of Enemy Air Defence (DEAD) to support future disruptive efforts targeting ammunition storage, troop concentrations and Command and Control (C2) nodes ahead of UAF offensive activity. At the intelligence cut off for this article, reports have been emerging of an open letter by scientists after the arrest of three Russian hyper-sonic missile scientists for treason in the past ten months. Regardless of their guilt, the timing of the letter (a form of quiet protest) and the widely ridiculed failure of Kinzhal missiles during this reporting period cannot be ignored. It is highly likely that the Russian State is entering a new period of paranoia, comparable to that seen in the Soviet era. This is paranoia is likely to ebb and flow publicly, with the UAF highly likely seizing the initiative, and emerging from its defensive posture to make territorial gains, coupled with the success of PATRIOT. Overall, however, with public disputes among leaders and evidence of RFAF desertion and surrendering from the frontline, this is almost certainly an undesirable position existentially for Russia amid the beginning of a UAF counter offensive.
Ukraine supporting 'partisan' operations across the border probably won't lose support, provided that the partisans operate with some restraint and don't commit atrocities. Anything which undermines the willingness of the Russians to support this war is generally fair game. I don't think the number will be that large and the Russians should be able to manage it without too much difficulty unless the idea spreads and they find themselves dealing with a wider insurrection, in which case all bets are off.Puja wrote: ↑Mon May 22, 2023 10:44 pm I'm loving the shade that the Ukraine spokesman was giving by parroting back Russia's lines about their little green men with a shit-eating grin. "Tanks can be bought in any military surplus store."
As long as Ukraine can maintain plausible deniability about their involvement, this is an interesting strategy. I doubt Russia has enough materiel or manpower to easily repulse a determined action on that border, so it could end up going quite far before being squashed, but Ukraine wants to be careful that they don't jeopardise their international support with this action.
Incredible that people are killing and dying for what is effectively a trolling operation
Puja
The really interesting thing is the disproportionate level of panic that the attack inside Russia seems to have caused. The banning of attacks across the border in return for NATO support has almost certainly made the Russians complacent. Whilst a handful of people won’t achieve that much of substance, they can still pose a real shock. For all the analysis of battlefield moves, western military observers can be a bit too Clausewitz in their approach and ignore the civilian moral perspective. Panic in Russian social media is an excellent result, particularly if officially it’s the Russians doing it themselves rather than Ukrainian forces.Tactical Military
Despite the Russian declaration of the complete occupation of Bakhmut, Donetsk Oblast, on 20 May 2023, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) have still been engaged in kinetic activity on the western edge of the urban centre (albeit with less intensity than previously observed), as well as on the flanks where UAF have continued localised counterattacks over the past two reporting periods – possibly with the intent of threatening encirclement of Russian units in the town centre. Reporting has also indicated that Russian Federation Armed Forces (RFAF) troop numbers have been increasing, whilst Wagner-owner, Yevgeniy Prigozhin, stated on the morning of 25 May 2023, that his forces were withdrawing out of Bakhmut. Prigozhin also stated he had lost 20,000 troops as a result of the operation, either through death or injury, however, estimates vary when combined with RFAF losses, assessed to total approximately 100,000 wounded and killed across all pro-Russian forces.
Kinetic activity on the outskirts of Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast, has resumed during this reporting period and in the vicinity of Marinka, which had seemingly been paused previously. Ground forces on both sides have published footage of captured persons, and reports of artillery bombardments and unguided aerial rockets targeting Avdiivka’s urban areas have been observed.
So What?
Although President Putin congratulated Wagner on their “successful” completion of the operation in Bakhmut, the continuation of kinetic activity highly likely indicates that UAF are still willing to fight Russian Forces in order to maintain the high rates of attrition. The context of the Russian announcement and highly likely information operation remains important; the UAF have been consciously ceding ground to Wagner forces and their supporting conventional RFAF units for some months now, with the operation within Bakhmut enduring for the last nine months. The RFAF are still highly likely to be engaged in kinetic activity, pushing west for months to come, yet also bolstering defensive lines against likely UAF counterattacks. It is highly likely that RFAF will attempt to continue in the direction of Khromove (3km west of Bakhmut), Ivanivske (5km west of Bakhmut), and subsequently Chasiv Yar (10km west of Bakhmut), highly likely handrailing the Main Supply Routes (MSRs) which have continued to be essential for the UAF. Given that Wagner are reportedly beginning to withdraw, any further progress by RFAF is almost certainly to be slower than Wagner’s, with associated elevated levels of attrition. It is highly likely that Wagner, the more capable fighting force compared to conscripted and mobilised RFAF, is being relived now that a symbolic Russian victory has been claimed. There has been no public declaration at this time regarding the next phase of operations for Wagner, however, it is highly likely that in the build-up to the anticipated UAF counteroffensive, Wagner forces will be reconstituting and resting, awaiting orders, and possibly being placed in reserve to respond to localised UAF counterattacks. Previously, Wagner forces have been seen to surge towards Melitopol, Zaporizhzhia Oblast in late February 2023, this type of activity will likely be seen again unless a specific Area of Operations (AoO) is designated again.
It is highly likely that the tactical pauses seen along the Avdiivka-Donetsk line during the last reporting period was related to the Bakhmut offensive being the Russian main effort in order to declare the offensive as successful, requiring the disproportionate allocation of RFAF indirect fires. Likely similar to the Russian perception of Bakhmut being crucial to control of the entire Donetsk Oblast, Avdiivka has been heavily targeted. Avdiivka sits on an area of high ground within two intersecting MSRs to the south-east, and the T-0504 to the north transiting north-east towards Chasiv Yar. Logistically, occupation of Avdiivka is highly likely to be beneficial, however, previous battles in 2014 and 2017 suggest that it likely has symbolic importance too. Currently, there is no indication that the Avdiivka urban area or the Avdiivka-Donetsk Line is a Russian main effort. It is likely that a Bakhmut-esque method of encirclement (if intended, and not simply the exploitation of the open, flat surrounding areas) will be equally as incremental, however, it is also likely that RFAF are not in a position to become entrenched in another battle of attrition. Instead, it is likely that RFAF are applying enough kinetic pressure to ensure that UAF whilst still technically defending Avdiivka, is unable to fully operate within the urban area.
Operational / Strategic Military
The recent incursion into Belgorod Oblast by elements of the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) has prompted various reactions from local and federal Russian authorities. In response, they declared a counterterrorism operation aimed at ensuring the safety of residents in the region. The Russian Ministry of Defence claimed to have successfully repelled the raid, forcing the “saboteurs” out of Belgorod Oblast. However, within the Russian information space, there has been a mixture of panic, internal divisions, and confusion among milbloggers and commentators. While the counterterrorism operation has ‘officially’ concluded, efforts are still underway to clear the affected areas.
So What?
This incident has raised concerns about the effectiveness of Russian defensive fortifications and the potential for further raids or Ukrainian counteroffensives. It also underscores the need for Russia to now consider the defence of its 2,295km land border with Ukraine, alongside its focused offensive efforts in Bakhmut. Throughout the conflict, NATO has consistently emphasised that Ukraine should refrain from initiating attacks or using NATO equipment to engage Russian forces on Russian soil. This insistence is likely grounded in the principles of collective defence, stability, and a diplomatic approach to resolving the conflict. NATO likely aims to prevent further escalation and promote a peaceful resolution while supporting Ukraine’s defence efforts. However, use of ‘Russian’ proxies aligned with the UAF circumvents these NATO-imposed limitations.
It can be argued that this stance has unintentionally allowed Russian forces to focus their efforts on offensive operations across a more limited AoO. By restricting Ukraine’s ability to directly confront Russian forces within Russia’s borders, NATO’s position may have provided Russia with a strategic advantage. An advantage that allowed Russian forces to concentrate their resources and attention on offensive actions instead of allocating significant resources to defend their territory.
Moreover, the incursion has revealed internal divisions and dissenting voices within Russia. Pro-Ukrainian volunteer groups, predominantly composed of Russian citizens, have triggered a range of reactions in the Russian information space. These reactions include accusations of treason and speculation about their motivations, highlighting the fragmented nature of public sentiment and the challenges faced by Russian authorities in maintaining a unified narrative. Such divisions’ existence emphasises the situation’s complexity and the difficulties Russia may encounter in effectively responding to the ongoing conflict.
Political
On 24 May 2023, NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, whilst in attendance at an event in Brussels, ruled out Ukraine joining NATO whilst the conflict with Russia was still ongoing.
So What?
Noting that there were different views within the alliance on the speed with which Ukraine should become a member, Stoltenberg likely made this statement ahead of the NATO summit to be held in Vilnius, Lithuania, in July 2023. Although Ukrainian President, Volodymir Zelensky requested in September 2023 fast-tracked membership, and Stoltenberg visited Kyiv in April 2023, it was highly likely symbolic and shows future intent. It is highly likely that overt NATO support to Ukraine will continue, with a view to Ukrainian membership in the future. However, immediate membership is likely to be given precedence to Sweden (with Finland’s membership expedited, joining in April 2023), as a country which also neighbours Russia, yet not engaged in conflict. Given that NATO allies have still not admitted Sweden, again, due to disagreements within the alliance, and whose membership is now not likely until spring 2024, it will still likely be some time yet before Ukraine does the same.
Ukraine’s membership in NATO within the current state of the conflict would highly likely intensify the conflict within Ukraine, possibly to geode NATO allies and/or Europe into a conflict it does not want. Yet it would also likely have political and strategic implications amongst countries other than Russia, who perceive global dominance to lie with the West or Western military blocs. China stated in point two of its proposed 12 Point Peace Plan, no further expansion of military blocs. Whilst this plan has not in any way been supported by President Zelensky, it highly likely shows sentiment. Regardless of Ukraine’s membership, NATO has likely operated and will continue to operate within the bounds it feels necessary to ensure that Ukraine has multi-faceted support.
What Next?
The declaration of Russian success in Bakhmut has likely been overshadowed by Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s publication of losses, leading to research and further speculation by milbloggers of Russian losses as a whole, and the suspicion that the Kremlin would never release official numbers. Bakhmut is the first “victory” for Russia in approximately a year, and has been hard won, with a high cost, likely for little gain. It is possible that wherever Wagner forces are committed next within Ukraine, the assumption amongst Wagner forces would be the commencing of another Bakhmut-esque battle of attrition, with Wagner likely having manifested a niche of Fighting in Built-Up Areas (FIBUA). However, the Belgorod incursion, an unmanned boat attack against the Russian intelligence collection vessel, Ivan Khurs, in the Black Sea, has demonstrated that Russia faces a multi-dimensional threat. It is also possible that these threats away from the frontline have not been considered when looking at the ease with which RDK and LSR crossed the border into Russia. This likely period of reconsolidating for Wagner and the emergence of new threats at sea and within Russia’s own border will also require a period of Russia reassessing likely UAF courses of action and mitigating against thinly spread RFAF across the battlespace.
We’re seeing a lot of battlefield shaping. The Russians will be left guessing (hopefully) where the main attack will come from.Which Tyler wrote: ↑Mon Jun 05, 2023 7:27 pm Looks like Ukraine is making some ground either side of the Mokri Yaly River around Velyka Novosilka.
Doesn't look like it's the main thrust, and no idea yet on how many Ukrainians there, but it sounds like one of the areas Russia had been pulling troops from, to throw into Bakhmut as Wagner extricated themselves from there - so an opportunistic foray or a diversion seems the most likely (to me) at this stage.
That's the area I was mentioning on Monday; from geolocated confirmations today, it looks like Ukraine have taken 3 villages on the right bank, and 1 on the left (and probably doing so 24+ hours ago, given Ukraine's Opsec).Sandydragon wrote: ↑Sun Jun 11, 2023 8:16 pm Ukraine claiming to have liberated villages near Velyka Novosilka, which is near Donetsk and also Mariupol. If correct the that just under 80 miles to Mariupol which would cut off a lot of Russian troops.
Squeaky bum time for the Russians
Hilarious. The article was sensible enough but clearly Time have their less able staff running the Twitter side of things.Which Tyler wrote: ↑Mon Jun 12, 2023 6:19 pm Erm...
Remind me where Chernobyl is again?
I guess Trump's confidential documents could become the USA's "Watergate"