Lizard wrote:On reflection, the difference was a superior bench and smarter sub strategy.
More than that, TBH.
1. The Springboks had a fairly simple, but exceedingly effective gameplan.
Their attack was built around 3-man pods, in a triangle. They were usually forwards, and the leading player has the option to offload or take it into contact. If Mostert is around, they'll probably choose the latter, since his job was to bash into the rucks, slowing the ball down for the ABs if they turned it over, or securing the ball for Faf to clear. At this stage, Pollard would be standing fairly deep. Because the All Blacks defensive line is solid, with no major gaps, they would create one by either drawing in one of the defenders to go for Pollard, or Faf would kick the ball himself, forcing the ABs defence to turn around, putting them into a footrace where they're on the backfoot from the get-go. With Mostert barrelling into the rucks like a tank, and Marx being a tough motherfucker in there, it gave the Bok halves an extra second or so to send the ball down the field, pretty much locking the ABs down between their tryline and 10m line. It was pretty much a return to the kick-and-chase game, supplemented by actually playing with ball-in-hand when necessary to create tries, rather than burgle them, which they'd been doing for years.
Going back a few steps to the triangle pod formation, by drawing an All Black defender out of that line, it creates a gap that the Boks were big or fast enough to exploit - case in point the Jesse Kriel try, where Naholo went for Kitshoff, who quickly passes to Kriel, who has enough pace to exploit said gap, and enough power to break through Crotty's tackle - and because Crotty is put into a 2-on-1 with Dyantyi right by him, he's not able to fully commit until Kriel goes for it. By the time Aaron Smith grabs ahold of Kriel's jersey, it's too late, since he's got enough momentum from his sprint to carry him over the line anyway.
Kolisi setting up de Allende's try was just him simply breaking Perry's tackle, and offloading to de Allende as he was caught by Tu'ungafasi. The rest was just de Allende's pace and power.
Kolbe's try was built on basics. Nothing special to it really, but a try nonetheless. Draw in the defence, and strike out wide. Still, he was lucky to get that one awarded, since IMO, it was borderline.
2. The Boks started to make costly lapses at around the 55th minute and were clearly starting to tire
It's not just that they had a smarter sub strategy, the Boks started to make basic errors. When Aaron Smith scored his try, that was built from just plain old good heads-up rugby from Taylor. The All Blacks recognise that Marx, who is easily one of the best breakdown operators running around getting to the ruck, and that the Springboks defence is placed right on the advantage line, and Taylor recognises that Faf de Klerk is MIA, so he grabs the ball and runs through the ruck - something which the Boks clearly hadn't anticipated. Aaron Smith is johnny-on-the-spot, running right behind him in support, so Taylor does a draw-and-pass, and Smith's pace does the rest of the work, outrunning a tackle attempt by Marx. le Roux is smart here, since he knows he can't prevent a try, but he goes in anyway to make the conversion awkward for Barrett. Smith has to veer towards the touchline, and dots down around the 5m line. Nevertheless, it was a try built on heads-up rugby, playing what's in front of them, and a costly error from Faf, who was miles out of position. Seriously, try to find him in the footage. He's nowhere to be seen.
By the time Ioane's scored his try, the Boks were starting to creak, as the All Blacks started to wrest control from them. I'd say this is an area where Read's captaincy actually shone through, since the ABs started to shift tactics, and were moving up a gear in speed. Unlike Wellington, they were also much more efficient in the chances they got, and made more of the possession they had. Because the speed of the All Blacks attack and moving the ball to the wings was so swift, you could see that the Boks defence was completely disorganised, with some players bursting out of position to try for an intercept or deliberate knock-on to prevent the try. Once Ioane got the ball, it he had enough room to get into the corner with no one in front of him. Pollard and de Allende do rush in to keep him on the sidelines, but you can also see le Roux, the Boks fullback and de facto last line of defence get drawn in by Barrett, who is also playing fullback at this stage.
The last two tries to the All Blacks were built on sheer bloody-mindedness and forward play, focusing on securing possession and gaining territory, even if by inches. In the case of Scott Barrett's try, he's shoved over by Paddy Tuipulotu and Ofa Tu'ungafasi. Both guys, particularly Tuipulotu, were making good progress in the pick-and-goes, while in the case of Savea, it was the forwards attacking the fringes of the ruck. What we also saw there was a variety in those moves forward, where the All Blacks would try different combinations and distances, so while they're keeping things tight and not moving too far away from the pack, it meant the Boks would constantly have to be thinking about how the All Black forwards would come at them - in pairs, a meter or two away, right on the fringes, would they take it to the backs, etc., because at this stage, they'd tried those different methods.